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INTRODUCTION
Scholars working in the fields of labor law, globalization, law and
development, and of course gender now encounter the family at every
turn. This is sometimes true even when families and households are
officially absent from the debate or issue under discussion, as is often
the case. Whether the topic is the transformation of labor and
employment law, the character of economic restructuring and market
reform, or the path of development policy, the place and function of
the family turn out to be key items of interest. Noticing, or failing to
notice, where the family fits in and what goes on within households
may completely change the perception of the issue, the understanding
* © 2010 Kerry Rittich.
** Faculty of Law, School of Public Policy and Governance, and Women and Gender
Studies Institute, University of Toronto; LL.B University of Alberta, 1992; S.J.D. Harvard
Law School, 1998.
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of how social and economic processes operate, and the assessment of
what is to be done at the level of norms, policy, and regulation.
The subject today is the place of families on the global economic
landscape. My specific concern is how households are connected to
the broader economy, to labor markets in particular, and how market
reforms and changing policy and regulatory priorities, in turn,
ultimately touch down in families and households. I want to suggest
that the current economic crisis is both revealing connections
between households, workplaces, and the broader economy that, if
hidden, have always been present and heightening the perils of
ignoring them. The crisis is also casting new light on the significance
of a wide range of legal rules and policies to the health and well-being
of families and households.
Families are on the edge in a number of senses. It is clear that
many families are "on the brink," that is, on the edge of a financial
precipice and at risk of falling out of the middle class, whether that is
because they are losing their jobs, or losing their homes or declaring
bankruptcy. But families are also on the cutting edge: they are a
leading indicator of change and crisis, the place where social and
economic transformation, not only of a personal but of a general
kind, are most clearly in view. Finally, families are at the edge in
another sense: rather than a separate and autonomous private world
or sphere, they are connected to markets and economies in myriad
ways both hidden and overt, and affected in direct and indirect ways
by the rules and policies that govern them.
In order to explore these edges, I want to take this opportunity
to talk about a set of interlinked transformations in households and in
labor markets. We already know at an intuitive level that there are
revolutions afoot at home and at work, and that they are linked
rather than independent events that serendipitously have emerged at
the same time. Most of us, after all, inhabit both worlds: we live in
households and work at jobs and we experience these connections as
we ourselves and those we know move across the worlds of work and
family. We know, too, that changes at work routinely provoke
changes in the organization of households, while transformations in
the household can sometimes destabilize norms and practices at work.
What I would like to do is formalize these intuitions by
describing a parallel set of transformations at home and at work-
fragmentation, feminization, and flexibilization-and placing them
within a larger context. The claim is that fragmentation, feminization,
and flexibilization are not simply related developments at home and
work. Nor are they best understood on their own terms. Instead, they
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can be thought of as pieces of a larger puzzle, processes that are
connected in interlocking ways both to the wider economy and to
changing policies, practices, and preoccupations of the state. In
particular, the transformations within households and at work are, in
part, a consequence of a larger set of governance projects and
priorities that have had wide circulation and support in the
international order. Designed to promote economic development
through increased market integration and private ordering, these
initiatives are devolving much more risk and responsibility to
individual workers and households and are systematically shifting the
position, structure, and fortunes of families at the same time as they
are both creating and normalizing a world of more precarious work.'
These projects and priorities are global, rather than limited,
particular, or regional in their ambitions. To say that they are global is
not to say that they are centrally organized, that they are uncontested,
that they generate a uniform set of consequences in either households
or work places, or even that different states are all doing the same
things. Rather, they are global in the following sense: it is possible to
identify across many jurisdictions common trends and preoccupations
concerning the regulation of households and labor markets, common
assumptions and arguments about the desirability or even the
inevitability of reforms, and international players and institutions that
play key and recurring roles in the defense of these policy and
regulatory reforms. The result is a "family resemblance" among the
governance and regulatory initiatives around work and family across
both the industrialized and developing worlds.
In recent years, households and labor markets have become
places of deep interest, and no small amount of intervention and
experimentation, as international and domestic regulators and policy
makers turn their attention to what does, and does not, go on in
households and labor markets. Anyone reading current literature on
development, economic restructuring, and market reform will
encounter sophisticated arguments about the need to prod and push
behavior in households and labor markets so that they are more
responsive to market signals.2 For example, families have become
1. See Kerry Rittich, Rights, Risk, and Reward: Governance Norms in the International
Order and the Problem of Precarious Work, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW
ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 31, 31-32 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens
eds., 2006).
2. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD EMPLOYMENT
OUTLOOK 2001, at 129-59 (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/12/
2079435.pdf (identifying the main policy challenge in respect of work/family issues as
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conduits for development assistance, as gender equality advocates
and international financial institutions champion strategies of
"investing in women" and construct gender equality indicators to
mark progress toward a better economic future for all.3 Households
are now the recipients of conditional transfers, as states seek to mold
family behavior in ways thought more conducive to better health and
educational outcomes, and thus to greater human capital formation
and higher growth.4  Formalizing informal economic activity,
sometimes including household production, is now viewed as a route
to enhancing growth as well as poverty alleviation.5 But profound
changes are envisioned and underway in the industrialized world too,
as states modify the rules governing work and welfare so as to reduce
"dependency" and increase levels of market participation. In both the
South and the North, these policy and regulatory shifts are not only
designed to change family and household behavior; they are also
designed to remake norms and expectations about the roles and
duties of individuals, households, and citizens in respect of economic
security.
encouraging greater labor market participation by mothers); THE WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995: WORKERS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 23-30 (1995)
(discussing the impact of household labor decisions on labor markets and economic
development); Int'l Monetary Fund, Growth and Institutions-Chapter IV: Unemployment
and Labor Market Institutions: Why Reforms Pay Off, WORLD ECON. OUTLOOK, Apr.
2003, at 129, 143-49, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/
pdf/chapter4.pdf (arguing that countries with high unemployment suffer from structural
deficiencies in their labor markets that may be remedied by loosening wage controls and
increasing competition in labor and product markets).
3. See generally MAYRA BUVINIC, CATHERINE GWIN & LISA M. BATES, INVESTING
IN WOMEN: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WORLD BANK (1996) (outlining a role
for the World Bank in "investment in physical and human capital" especially in relation to
women); KAREN OPPENHEIM MASON, GENDER EQUALITY AND AID DELIVERY: WHAT
HAS CHANGED IN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION AGENCIES SINCE 1999? (Org. Econ.
Co-operation & Dev. ed., 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/0/
38773781.pdf (discussing agencies' attempts to achieve gender equality by employing "a
specific targeted approach in which equality or women's advancement" is part of a given
aid package).
4. See ANNE MARIE GOETZ ET AL., UNITED NATIONS DEv. FUND FOR WOMEN,
PROGRESS OF THE WORLD'S WOMEN 2008/2009: WHO ANSWERS TO WOMEN? 35, 46,
U.N. Sales No. 08.1II.F.1 (2008), available at http:l/www.unifem.orglprogressl2008/medial
POWWO8_Report -Full Text.pdf; Laura B. Rawlings & Gloria M. Rubio, Evaluating the
Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, 20 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 29, 29-
30 (2005); Maxine Molyneux, Conditional Cash Transfers: A 'Pathway to Women's
Empowerment'? 14-15 (Dep't for Int'l Dev., Pathways Working Paper No. 5, 2008),
available at http://www.pathwaysofempowerment.org/PathwaysWP5-website.pdf.
5. COMM'N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR & UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAMME, MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR EVERYONE 4 (2008), available at
http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/library.shtml.
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But if home and work are key sites of governance intervention
and activity, it is also in households and labor markets that we are
most clearly able to see the consequences of the broader governance
agenda of which they are a part. We can think of households and
labor markets as the terminal sites of the economic system, the place
where the effects of a wide range of governance decisions often take
their most intimate and immediate form. Decisions about financial
markets, monetary policy, trade and investment links, and even land
reform that are often made far away and directed at concerns that
seem remote from workers and families, in the end, turn out to be
central to the well-being of both. If this is a claim that might once
have seemed obscure or far-fetched, it no longer appears that way
anymore.
I. THE CRISIS, CONTEXT, AND THE CURRENT MOMENT
A couple of years ago it was difficult if not impossible to
persuade policy makers in the North that there was anything to be
seriously worried about on the economic front. To be sure, there was
evidence of growing income inequality6 and flat or falling wages for
the majority of the population, especially in countries such as the
United States.7 These and other disquieting changes and trends in the
economic security and activities of families and workers were being
tracked by sociologists, political scientists, legal analysts, economists,
and other scholars. For example, levels of indebtedness and
bankruptcy rates were rising, and skyrocketing among women,8 long-
term or structural unemployment showed a marked uptick,9
productivity increases were not translating into higher incomes for
workers, ° and economic recoveries were no longer securely linked to
job growth. 1 Overall, workers and citizens were at greater economic
6. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-
1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1-3 (2003); Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of
Top Incomes in the U.S., PATHWAYS MAG., Winter 2008, at 6, 6, available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/pdfs/pathways/winter 2008/winter_2008.pdf.
7. See LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, THE STATE
OF WORKING AMERICA, 2008/2009, at 77-79 (2008).
8. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 4-7 (2003).
9. See Lucia Mutikani, Structural Unemployment Crisis Stalking U.S. Economy,
REUTERS, Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5955NE20091006.
10. Jared Bernstein & Lawrence Mishel, Economy's Gains Fail to Reach Most
Workers' Paychecks (Econ. Pol'y Inst., EPI Briefing Paper No. 195, 2007),
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp195/.
11. See Kathleen Pender, Are We Facing Another Jobless Recovery?, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 6, 2009, at C1, available at http://sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/08/06/
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risk than before. 12 Nonetheless, the dominant view was a positive one:
things were good, and they were getting better. Moreover, we had, in
some senses, reached the "end of history" on important questions
about the organization of economic life. 3 Market ordering with
minimal regulation was embraced across the political spectrum, and
individualism and entrepreneurialism on the part of citizens and
workers was the order of the day. 4
The outlook is distinctly different now. The financial crisis from
which we have yet to conclusively emerge is illuminating two facets of
the global order which were formerly more obscured.
A. Connecting Households and Markets
The first facet that has been revealed is the deep interconnection
between what happens in and to households and what occurs in the
broader economy. The sheer precariousness of the economic position
of so many workers and households is reminding us that if we did not
know or had forgotten it before, both households and workers are
acutely vulnerable to broader economic upheavals and downturns.
However, the process works in both directions: not only are the
fortunes of families and workers linked to the broader economy, it
turns out that the economy too is dependent on the actions and
decisions of workers and families.
These interconnections operate at the international as well as the
local and national levels. Scholars of migration and development have
observed for some time the ways in which families and entire
communities can be upended and transformed by political decisions
and economic events that include regional economic integration,
trade liberalization, and fiscal austerity drives, as well as economic
contractions and financial crises. 5 A frequent consequence is the
fracturing of households and the dispersal of their members, now a
central part of the experience of development and globalization in
much of the world. The economic health and survival of households,
BUT819402D.DTL (showing table of last two recessions (1991 and 2001) which were
followed by long periods of rising or flat unemployment).
12. JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY
AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 12-13 (rev. & expanded ed. 2008).
13. See SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 33-34 (2002).
14. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION 134-35 (1999); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE
LAST MAN 41-42 (1992).
15. See SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW 97 (1988).
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and sometimes entire communities, has been feminized,16 as women
have entered and come to form an increasingly large part of the flow
of global migrants.17 At the same time as sending states have come to
rely on the remittances that migrants send home, receiving countries
have become so thoroughly dependent on the presence and services
of migrants for many forms of labor that entire sectors of their
economies could not function, at least as they now do, in their
absence.' 8 Migrant workers perform not only domestic, agricultural,
and sex work, as is well-known; in many places, they also provide
significant parts of the workforce in construction, service, and
industrial production too. 19 Both the decisions of individual migrants
and the mutual dependence of states in the North and South speak
volumes about the chain of events stretching from the level of the
household to the economy that global processes have either set in
motion or reinforced. These links would be difficult if not impossible
to disentangle or break, even if we were inclined to do so. This
intense interconnection between the decisions of families and the
structures of economies is simply one of the conditions of our time.
It turns out that globalization is not merely upending households
in the Third World or periphery: homes have been abandoned,
neighborhoods devastated, and entire towns and regions hollowed
out by economic restructuring and the off-shoring of services and
production in the North as well."° As foreclosures and job losses
mount, the crisis is revealing yet more interconnections between
households and markets and, at the same time, demonstrating that
16. Saskia Sassen, Women's Burden: Counter-geographies of Globalization and the
Feminization of Survival, 53 J. INT'L AFF. 503,506 (2000).
17. See Hania Zlotnik, The Global Dimensions of Female Migration, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST., Mar. 2003, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/
display.cfm?ID=109. But see U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., International Migrant Stock:
The 2008 Revision, U.N. Doc POP[DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008 (2009), http://esa.un.org/
migration/index.asp (select "Female migrants as percentage of all international migrants"
as variable and "World" as region) (female migrants as percentage of all international
migrants calculated from world database).
18. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO
(2d ed. 2001) (describing the centrality of low wage service and care workers, many of
whom are migrants, to global cities and the post-industrial economy); GLOBAL WOMAN:
NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY (Barbara Ehrenreich &
Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002) (exploring the gendered nature of care and sex work
in the global economy).
19. See International Labour Conference, Geneva, Switz., May 31-June 16, 2005, A
Global Alliance Against Forced Labour, Report I(B), $1223-24, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilcilc93/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf.
20. See BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION
OF AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING
OF BASIC INDUSTRIES 49,67 (1982).
15332010]
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the process also works in reverse. Not only are households adversely
affected by economic downturns; it turns out that, at least in
consumer-driven economies, the severity of economic downturns and
the health of the economy as a whole are ineluctably tied to the status
and security of households and workers. To put it simply, there is a
series of feedback loops between the microprocesses of the family-
the decisions that families and family members make about when and
where to work and whether and how to spend their resources-and
those within the economy that are now in full view. The more we see,
the more it is apparent that the prospects are remote for stabilizing
the economy without paying serious attention to the declining
resources of the households and the degraded and precarious status
of workers. No return to normal in the broader economy seems
possible without more jobs, without higher incomes, and without a
modicum of economic security and stability in citizens' personal and
family lives. Yet what is striking is how little attention has been paid
to the complex connections between households and markets;
untangling these connections, understanding how they operate, and
mapping the precise nature of the feedback loops between the family
and the market is now the task at hand.
The second facet of the global economic order that has come to
light in the current crisis is the frequent disjuncture between advances
in the overall state of the economy and improvements in human well-
being, whether measured in the aggregate or in terms of the status of
particular groups. It has been clear for a while that there may be a
considerable gap between economic progress and social progress.
Depending on how they are distributed, the gains from growth may
either improve general welfare or by contrast leave the majority
untouched or even worse off. 1 The claim is that, as of summer 2009,
the recession is now officially over.22 Yet whatever the state of the
recovery in the broader economy, we have yet to see a secure floor
under the declines in either the jobs or the housing market.23 In the
21. This theme is explored by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi in
their recent report. See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI,
COMM'N ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECON. PERFORMANCE & SOC. PROGRESS, REPORT
BY THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND
SOCIAL PROGRESS 8 (2009), available at http://media.ft.com/cms/f3b4c24a-a141-llde-
a88d-00144feabdcO.pdf (the "Sarkozy Report").
22. See Scott Lanman & Craig Torres, Bernanke Says U.S. Recession 'Very Likely'
Has Ended, BLOOMBERG PRESS, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aflWYDOhCPqA.
23. See Janet Morrissey, Still Hunting for a Bottom in Housing, TIME, Jan. 7, 2010,
http://www.time.comltimelbusiness/article/0,8599,1952132,00.html; Recovery Still Too
1534 [Vol. 88
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United States and United Kingdom, for example, unemployment and
foreclosures both continue to rise, and they are expected to do so for
the foreseeable future, whatever "green shoots" or other signs of
stabilization are visible on the horizon. 4 In the United States, large
numbers of workers are un- or underemployed if broader measures of
unemployment that capture discouraged workers and those who are
involuntarily working part-time are used.2 ' An unprecedented
number of homes in the United States are on a path toward, or
already in, foreclosure.26 In addition, the bite of the crisis is uneven;
minority households are suffering reversals of fortune that far
outstrip those of the nation as a whole,27 and low-income families are
experiencing unemployment rates that are many multiples of those at
the top.28 To put it simply, for the vast majority of workers and
families the crisis is far from over. Moreover, it is unclear that there
will ever be a return to "normal" on the jobs front. In some sectors,
the crisis has accelerated the outsourcing and industrial restructuring
that was already underway,29 and it seems likely that many of the jobs
Timid to Halt Rising Unemployment, Says OECD Economic Outlook, OECD ECON.
OUTLOOK, Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649-34109
44083593 1 11 37443,00.html.
24. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, August Joblessness Hit 10% in 14 States and D.C.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, at B4.
25. For current unemployment statistics, see Press Release, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Employment Situation Summary (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (summarizing U.S. unemployment data for January 2010).
The current crisis has seen unemployment rise as high as 10.2% in the United States. See
David Leonhardt, Jobless Rate Hits 10.2%, with More Underemployed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7, 2009, at Al. To a more limited degree, this is also true in Canada. See Ken Lewenza,
Rising Employment Number Masks Devastated Job Market: Analysts Hail Recovery but
Deeper Probing Reveals More Precarious Situation for Workers, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 8,
2010, at A13, available at http://www.thestar.com/opinion/article/761419--rising-
employment-number-masks-devastated-job-market.
26. See Lynn Adler, U.S. 2009 Foreclosures Shatter Record Despite Aid, REUTERS,
Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60DOLZ20100114.
27. See Greg Kaufmann, The Silent Depression, NATION, Sept. 25, 2009,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091012/kaufmann.
28. CTR. FOR LABOR MKT. STUDIES, NORTHEASTERN UNIV., LABOR
UNDERUTILIZATION PROBLEMS OF U.S. WORKERS ACROSS HOUSEHOLD INCOME
GROUPS AT THE END OF THE GREAT RECESSION: A TRULY GREAT DEPRESSION
AMONG THE NATION'S Low INCOME WORKERS AMIDST FULL EMPLOYMENT AMONG
THE MOST AFFLUENT 4 (2010), available at http://www.clms.neu.edu/publication/
documents/LaborUnderutilizationProblems of__.U.pdf.
29. See Erika Kinetz, How the U.S. Hiring Freeze Is Working for India, GLOBE &
MAIL, Jan. 21, 2010, http:/www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/as-demand-for-
outsourcing-grows-indias-hiringarticlel43790 4 /.
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that evaporated during the recession have disappeared for good, to be
replaced, if at all, with work of a more precarious nature.3 °
There are many different ways to account for globalization-
some optimistic, some less so. Because the crisis has highlighted its
dark side, and because the pervasive experience of precariousness at
home and work is neither well-theorized nor adequately explained in
the dominant narratives about global economic integration, let me
focus on this side of the equation.
Put simply, globalization creates winners and losers. It tends to
both concentrate gains and losses and disperse the economic positions
of different groups. From the standpoint of the majority of citizens,
the most salient feature of global economic integration has been the
experience of (relatively rapid) social and economic change combined
with a massive reallocation of risk and the redistribution of rewards.
In the North, much of this is a result of changing fortunes in the labor
market. Scholars have documented in detail the changes that greater
product and labor market competition-as well as policies designed
to promote greater flexibility-have wrought for workers.31Although
experiences vary among different jurisdictions, the general trends and
patterns are clear enough. Workers in the North are gaining less from
their labor and experiencing much greater volatility of income and
economic insecurity than before.32 In many countries, access to social
insurance and income transfers have been curtailed as well,3 3 leaving
30. See Mutikani, supra note 9.
31. See generally GUY STANDING, GLOBAL LABOUR FLEXIBILITY: SEEKING
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1999) (analyzing the impact of labor market flexibility policies on
workers); LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES
AND POSSIBILITIES (Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl Klare eds., 2002)
(canvassing the impact of and consequences for globalization on labor law in different
jurisdictions); Lourdes Benerfa, Globalization, Women's Work, and Care Needs: The
Urgency of Reconciliation Policies, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1502-03 (2010) (describing, inter
alia, the global trend to more flexible and precarious work); Kerry Rittich, Global Labour
Policy as Social Policy, 14 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 227 (2008) (describing the collapse of
labor market concerns into economic objectives within the reform policies promoted by
the international financial institutions); Joseph Stiglitz, Keynote Address at the Industrial
Research Association: Democratic Development as the Fruits of Labor (Jan. 25, 2000), in
JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND THE WORLD BANK: THE REBEL WITHIN 279 (2001) (describing
the approach to labor market issues within the World Bank).
32. See Andrew Green & Heidi Shierholz, Minimum Wage Workers: Better Educated,
Worse Compensated, ECON. POL'Y INST. Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.epi.org/
economicsnapshots/entry/snapshot_20090722/. For an analysis, see Leah F. Vosko,
Precarious Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labour Market
Insecurity, in PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT: UNDERSTANDING LABOUR MARKET
INSECURITY IN CANADA 3,21 (Leah F. Vosko ed., 2006).
33. See STANDING, supra note 31, at 258-59.
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families and households increasingly on their own to manage as best
they can in circumstances that may be largely out of their control.
At first glance, workers in the global South look like winners in
these transformations; after all, they may have new jobs as a result of
production or services that have been outsourced from the North. Yet
the high levels of labor force turnover associated with global
production speak to an underlying degree of dissatisfaction about the
terms and conditions of work that is hard to discount.34 Workers in
the global South, too, remain at risk of acute declines in income and
sudden reversals of economic fortune, whether from economic
downturns or simply from the ordinary and expected competition
from other low-wage jurisdictions.35 Although we hear less about
them in mainstream accounts than we should, even in countries that
are doing well, many people have been left out of these new
economic activities and opportunities, and some are even worse off.36
Whether, and how much, the picture remains rosy if the costs as well
as the benefits of these changes are counted is uncertain. 7
B. Explaining Insecurity-Four Observations
How might we explain this experience of insecurity? Here, four
things seem worth emphasizing. The first is simply the central role of
decision, policy, and rule-that is, matters of law and governance-in
the production as well as the amelioration of insecurity. The changing
fortunes of workers and households are often attributed to technical
and information innovations associated with globalization,38 greater
competition among firms and workers,39 the rising premium placed on
skill and adaptability in a dynamic, knowledge-based economy,4 ° or
the rise of new contingent and precarious forms of employment that
are poor in terms of the economic rewards, working conditions, job or
34. See SARAH PERMAN ET AL., INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS,
BEHIND THE BRAND NAMES: WORKING CONDITIONS AND LABOUR RIGHTS IN EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONES 7 (2004), available at http://www.icftu.org/www/
PDF/EPZreportE.pdf.
35. Id.
36. See BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND
GLOBAL INEQUALITY 131, 209 (2005).
37. See STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 21, at 53; Peter S. Goodman, Emphasis on
Growth Is Called Misguided, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,2009, at B1.
38. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 36 (2d ed. 2000).
39. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of Free Trade, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 219,227-28 (1993).
40. Thomas J. Courchene, Human Capital in an Information Era, 28 CAN. PUB. POL'Y
73, 73-74 (2002).
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employment security, and/or control exercised by workers.'
However, there is reason to think that these declining fortunes have
at least as much to do with governance priorities and regulatory
decisions. Put simply, whatever the role of technical and economic
transformations, growing insecurity needs to be understood in legal
and institutional terms as well. In many jurisdictions, the last two to
three decades have been a period of intense regulatory change. Legal
and economic reforms, especially in respect of trade and investment,
have greatly enhanced the volatility of markets and increased both
the likelihood of economic change and the speed at which the
reallocation of the labor force occurs.42 Those same reforms have also
affected the legal rights of workers and employers and the social
entitlements of citizens. Although they play out in a range of ways for
social groups in different places, in general, reforms-including those
adopted to spur development and respond to economic crises-have
altered the bargaining power and exit options for workers and
families to their detriment.43 As I will describe, they have also
imposed new costs and greater risks on workers and households.
The second thing of interest is the object of those decisions,
policies, and rules. If globalization is about governance-norms,
institutions, and practices, both formal and informal-as much as it is
simply a fact about or condition of the contemporary world, then new
governance norms and regulatory projects appear, at least in the first
instance, to be primarily directed at markets and the economy writ
large rather than at families or households. I want to suggest,
however, that this reallocation of rights and entitlements in the labor
41. KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-86 (2004).
42. See generally Kevin Banks, The Impact of Globalization on Labour Standards: A
Second Look at the Evidence, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW
77, 79-82 (John D. R. Craig & S. Michael Lynk eds., 2006) (explaining the effects of
competitive forces on labor markets and the possibility that they may reduce the
redistributive effects of labor standards).
43. See Simon Deakin & Hannah Reed, River Crossing or Cold Bath? Deregulation
and Employment in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s, in WHY DEREGULATE LABOUR
MARKETS? 115, 115-19, 127 (Gosta Esping-Andersen & Marino Regini eds., 2000)
(examining the complex relationship between regulatory change and economic outcomes
in the 1980s and 1990s in the British labor market; challenging popular understanding that
increased flexibility translated to labor market gains through higher employment rates and
noting the accompanying increases in inequality and social exclusion); Stiglitz, supra note
31, at 285-86 (explaining that workers bore the costs of the East Asian financial crisis
through increased unemployment and reduced wages and noting the absence of unions
and attention to workers' rights in discussions about reforms to the international economic
architecture as well as the "studied inattention" to the possible role of the labor movement
in economic development).
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market and in the sphere of social protection and social policy is not
only visible and very much experienced in the family; in the end, such
reforms are very much "about" the family. Decisions about labor
market governance and social policy, and a wide range of other issues
too, can end up having a profound impact on the organization of
families and households: what their priorities are and the direction in
which they must evolve; where and how they live; and with whom and
where they form or dissolve communities. In some cases, they are
matters of life or death for families.
The crisis is widening our perception and increasing our
knowledge of the forms and types of governance that are relevant to
families; it is also making more visible the manner in which
households and markets are articulated to each other. Because of the
current state of economic flux, we can see more clearly than ever that
the boundary between households and markets is porous, unstable,
and perhaps even fictional. But we can also discern some of the ways
that it is possible to move that boundary, and thereby change
households as well as markets, through legal and institutional
reform.44
Although it would be easy to miss this fact given its absence from
most debates about the economy, the household remains an
important site of production, of care, of resource provision, and of
redistribution, important not only to the family but to the broader
economy and to social life writ large.45 But what goes on in the
family-how much production of goods and services, of what type
and intensity, and by whom-is deeply affected by what does, or does
not, go on in the market, the state, and other social institutions. Think
for a moment of child care. It may be provided in a range of ways: at
home, in the market, in the community, or through a public
institution. Demand for care in the market will be affected by the
level of women's participation in labor markets which, in turn, is
partly determined by conditions in the wider economy. How much
care is actually available outside the home, whether on a voluntary
basis or for a fee, and of what quality and at what price, will affect
44. KERRY RITrICH, RECHARACrERIZING RESTRUCIURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION
AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM 182-96 (2002) (describing the interconstitutive
relationship between the productive and reproductive economies; the varied ways that
tasks and activities can be allocated between the household and the market; and the effect
of legal rules and norms on the boundary between home and market and the recognition
of activities as productive or not).
45. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1995, at 97 (1995), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1995/chapters/
(estimating $11 trillion of unpaid work performed by women worldwide).
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both the degree of care that is performed in the home versus the
market as well as the amount of paid work performed in the market,
especially by women. Both the supply of and demand for care at
home and in the market are affected, in part, by the price of care
relative to other income generating opportunities. But the price of
care is not merely a function of market processes: it depends on
numerous regulatory and institutional details, as does the price of
other forms of labor: tax law, labor law, equality and discrimination
law, for example, all might have some bearing on its cost. Moreover,
the extent to which families take up external options for care will turn
to some degree on whether and to what extent the provision of care is
subsidized by non-household members or directly provided through
other institutions. Those subsidies might come through payroll taxes,
tax credits, or general tax revenues; the care itself might be directly
provided as a public service like education, subsidized in part via
some state program, or provided as an employment-related benefit.
And this only begins the analysis; many other factors might affect the
organization, cost, and provision of care as well. The general point to
emphasize is that, even if we restrict our focus to the issue of child
care, we can see an interminable loop of interactions between
households and markets, with no single or stable point of equilibrium.
There are many possible arrangements, each with different effects on
the labor and resources of family members, women in particular.
What particular settlement we end up with at any given point will be
deeply affected by the legal rules through which both household and
market activity are organized.46
The border between the family or household and the market may
also be uncertain. Think for a minute of a family business in which
family members manage and integrate the performance of household
and business activities in ways that make the two domains difficult to
separate. Indeed, imagine a self-employed single parent, typically a
woman, in which the answer to the question, "what is a family versus
a business expense?" is not only uncertain, the distinction itself may
be unhelpful: in some cases it is both, at the same time.
As we are learning anew, the boundary between households and
the broader economy is also transitory, contingent, and to some
extent, politically and ideationally determined. Settled norms about
what families do and what their responsibilities are may undergo
transformation as a result of change from outside. For all of these
reasons, rather than cabining home and market in separate spheres,
46. RITTICH, supra note 44, at 190-96.
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for many purposes it makes sense to imagine an integrated system or
sphere of economic activity, one in which the rules, institutions, and
decisions in one place inevitably affect the system as a whole. Given
the overlap and interpenetration between the family and the market,
much economic reorganization and restructuring will inevitably be
social restructuring too. When the policies, rules, and norms that
govern the market change, we should expect that they will provoke
transformation in household norms and practices too.47 From this
vantage point, it is easier to see how and why reforms to the market
are not only destined to affect households and families; some are, in
essence, also reforms to households and families.
Third, moments of crisis and transition are always also moments
of redistribution.' Legal and economic reforms and interventions that
are instituted to manage crises and direct the path of recovery or
effect a transition to a new order not only generate effects beyond,
sometimes far beyond, their intended objects; they invariably
reallocate power, resources, and opportunities in ways that affect the
status and interests of social groups as well. 49 As is now all too clear,
actions taken, or not taken, to regulate the market can increase or
decrease the value of family and household assets-including, of
course, that most valuable of assets, the family home. But decisions
about which firms or sectors of the economy to bail out or rescue and
which to leave to their fates may spell sickness or health, life or death
for neighborhoods, communities, even entire regions.5 0 Nor are such
interventions neutral as between the forms of family life that they
permit and promote or alternatively discourage and destroy. Rather,
they may set in motion a chain of events that encourage the
dissolution or reformation of households, disperse family members,
channel them into new economic activities, or render old ones no
longer viable.
Fourth, these governance activities that operate on the family
and the world of work should be understood as knowledge practices
as well as regulatory activities. Enormous effort and considerable
resources are being expended not simply to change the rules of the
47. Id. at 195.
48. Id. at 156-58 (describing the change in legal powers and entitlements entailed by
reform and thus the inevitability of redistribution in the course of restructuring).
49. Id. at 200-26 (discussing the manner in which economic reforms and restructuring
designed to promote transition to liberal market orders are likely to systematically and
adversely alter the position of women).
50. See Joe Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,614 (1988)
(discussing the impact of the closing of the Youngstown steel plant).
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game at home and work. Rather, the aim is to transform values and
expectations about the family, the market, and the state; to
recalibrate the normative balance between public and private
responsibility; to challenge entrenched social rights and remake
established conceptions of gender equality; and to bring under greater
surveillance and control economic and social spaces in their totality.
By way of illustration, the next Part will focus on three processes in
which these transformative practices are visible: fragmentation,
feminization, and flexibilization.
II. FRAGMENTATION, FEMINIZATION, FLEXIBILIZATION
At the end of World War II, states all over the industrialized
world moved to enshrine a series of interlocking labor market policies
and social protections schemes to moderate the consequences of
economic downturns for their workers and backstop the economic
security of their citizens.51 In the United States, beginning with the
New Deal legislation and reaching its apogee in the Great Society
programs of the 1960s, a web of rules and policies was constructed to
ensure access to collective bargaining52 and fair labor standards,53 as
well as social security,54 employment insurance,55 job training,56 equal
opportunity at work,57 and income support programs, especially to
families with dependent children.58 The result, in the United States, as
elsewhere, was a social contract that specified, both directly and by
default, a division of labor and allocated roles, responsibilities, and
51. See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE
CAPITALISM 101 (1990); Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, 48 WORLD
POL. 143, 146-47 (1996); John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 388
(1982).
52. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
53. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006)).
54. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 201-210, 49 Stat. 620, 622-25 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-302 (2006)).
55. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 301-303.
56. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Part B, Pub. L. No. 88-452, §§ 111-116, 78
Stat. 508, 512-27 (repealed 1981).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-2000a (2006)).
58. Social Security Act §§ 401-406, repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (2006)).
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risks among the three key institutions responsible for welfare:
employers and the labor market, the state, and the family.59
It is common ground among labor scholars and students of
globalization that the foundation underneath this social contract has
been cut away by transformations in legal consciousness' as well as
massive changes in the organization of economic activity that affect
the world of work.61 These developments are not limited to specific
geographic locations or to particular sectors or types of work. Instead,
they are generalized phenomena linked to processes of globalization
that can be identified in virtually every country. At the same time,
there are also profound changes underway within families. These
parallel transformations both reflect and are themselves shifting the
relationship between home and work. Operating in tandem, they risk
creating something of a perfect storm in which work and family are in
open conflict. It is well-recognized that this situation is increasingly
stressful, difficult and unmanageable for both workers and their
families. But these conflicts also generate significant short, medium,
and long term costs to the economy, costs that we have not in some
cases begun to notice, let alone adequately weigh. Without significant
attention and change of direction, particularly concerning regulatory
priorities, there is no reason to think that this scenario will get much
better.
How might we understand the path by which we have reached
this state of affairs? One way is to consider the processes of
fragmentation, feminization, and flexibilization that are underway at
home and at work.
59. See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL
ECONOMIES 35 (1999); Kerry Rittich, Equity or Efficiency: International Institutions and
the Work/Family Nexus, in LABOUR LAW, WORK, AND FAMILY 43, 52-55 (Joanne
Conaghan & Kerry Rittich eds., 2005).
60. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19,
63-68 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
61. See Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund, Regulating Labour in the Wake of
Globalisation: New Challenges, New Institutions, in REGULATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE
OF GLOBALISATION 1, 1-5 (Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund eds., 2008); Karl Klare,
Countervailing Workers' Power as a Regulatory Strategy, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION 63, 64-65 (Hugh Collins, Paul Davies & Roger Rideout eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Countervailing Power]; Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative
Labour and Employment Law, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:
TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES, supra note 31, at 3, 4-5 [hereinafter
Horizons of Labour Law].
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A. Fragmentation, Feminization, and Flexibilization at Work
1. Fragmentation
The standard employment relationship with settled expectations
around working time, norms about regular and rising wages, and
defined benefits organized around a normative worker known as the
"male breadwinner" are increasingly scarce in the post-industrial
labor markets of the global North.62 Rather than a single, or even
dominant, model of work organization, workers now labor under a
multitude of different contractual arrangements, from normal "full-
time" work with predictable wages and benefits to casual, part-time,
contract, and self-employment. This diverse array of work
arrangements, in turn, is a result of profound changes in the
organization of firms and the delivery of products and services in the
post-industrial economy.63 Firms and workplaces have been vertically
disintegrated, decentralized and reorganized as networks of firms and
contractors, sometimes with only ephemeral rather than enduring
relations to each other.' As work is outsourced and subcontracted to
other firms, workers end up in a variety of different employment and
work situations;65 it follows that they are also subject to different
terms and conditions at work, including quite wide-ranging wages and
benefits for performing the same or very similar work. Although it
may seem obvious, it needs to be said that in general, fragmentation
has not worked to the advantage of workers. Nor does it simply
reflect the replacement of a single work model with an appealing, or
at least understandable, array of alternatives. Instead, for workers the
fragmentation of the employment relationship is associated with
decreasing returns to work, much greater assumption of risk, and an
62. See LEAH F. VOSKO, TEMPORARY WORK: THE GENDERED RISE OF A
PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 29-31 (2000); Simon Deakin, The Contract
of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution, 11 HIST. STUD. INDUS. REL. 1, 32 (2001);
Ulrich Muckenberger, Non-Standard Forms of Work and the Role of Changes in Labour
and Social Security Regulation, 17 INT'L J. SOC. L. 381, 391-95 (1989).
63. Judy Fudge, Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of
Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 609, 611-17
(2006).
64. Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical
Disintegration to Employment Protection Laws, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 356
(1990); Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization, Globalization and Privatization: Three
Challenges to Labor Rights in Our Time, in REGULATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE OF
GLOBALISATION, supra note 61, at 115,116.
65. STANDING, supra note 31, at 101-14.
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increasing disconnect between labor market participation and
economic security.66
2. Feminization
Labor markets have also been feminized. Indeed, as job losses
have concentrated in male-dominated sectors like manufacturing,
construction, and high-end financial services during the current
downturn, a landmark has been reached: the labor markets in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom are now
approaching the point at which they are female-dominated.67 While
part of this shift in the composition of the workforce is attributable to
the revolution in gender expectations, opportunities, and norms that
has transformed almost every dimension of social life in the last
generation, much can be explained simply in terms of economic
factors. A variety of forces have converged to increase the pressure
on women to participate in the market, including those who were
formerly exempt from such work because they were understood to be
engaged in socially valuable care work.68 The demise of the male-
breadwinner norm and the progressive difficulty in maintaining a
middle-class-or even a basic-existence on a single wage has
conspired to draw millions of women into the paid labor force of the
industrialized, transitioning, and developing worlds.69 Indeed, the
feminization that is visible in the labor markets all over the world is
arguably as much the product of the relentless economic pressure
arising from declining subsistence opportunities and the general
degradation of the wages of male workers as it is the result of new
economic opportunities and greater desire for market work on the
part of women.70 In the global South, feminization has been part of a
66. ULRICH BECK, THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF WORK 72-76 (2000); Katherine V.
Stone, In the Shadow of Globalization: Changing Firm-Level and Shifting Employment
Risks in the United States, in 2 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES
23,24-25 (Beverly Crawford ed., 2008).
67. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: A
DATABOOK 1 (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2009.pdf; Catherine
Rampell, Women Now a Majority in American Workplaces, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at
A10.
68. The previous entitlement to income transfers to support unpaid work at home
through programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") was, in
any event, highly racialized and always restricted to women deemed "deserving". See
LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 39-49 (1994).
69. See, e.g., SASSEN, supra note 15, at 107-09; Catherine Rampell, As Layoffs Surge,
Women May Pass Men in Job Force, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at Al.
70. Lisa Belkin, The New Gender Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, (Magazine), at 11.
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concerted development strategy.7 In the North, structural changes in
the labor market, including the decline of middle class manufacturing
jobs in places such as Detroit and Windsor, have played a role;72 so
has the rise of the historically less-organized and more poorly paid
service sector along with a high-skill, information, and knowledge
intensive sector in the post-industrial economy.73
3. Flexibilization
What joins the fragmentation and feminization of work is the
third change, the flexibilization of labor markets. Labor market
flexibility is not only a feature of workplace relations in the new
economy; it has been consciously adopted as an economic governance
strategy, a priority reform to stimulate growth.74 Labor market
flexibility-understood as reforms that weaken or preclude job
security provisions and anything more than "core" or basic labor
standards, decentralize worker collective action, and remove many of
the constraints on employers to deploy labor as they see fit or as
changing circumstances dictate-has been enshrined as a good
governance norm at the international level for at least fifteen years.75
Every serious student of labor markets can describe the ways in which
flexibility norms have left their mark on domestic policy and
regulation and eroded the worker power and workplace protections
provided under the preexisting social contract.76
Labor market institutions, from fair labor standards to collective
bargaining rules, are the classic means of redressing the imbalance of
71. Guy Standing, Global Feminization Through Flexible Labor: A Theme Revisited,
27 WORLD DEV. 583, 585 (1999).
72. BLUESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 20, at 29-32, 35-36.
73. See SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE
NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY 137-42 (1998).
74. The classic statement about the benefits of flexible labor markets is found in ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD JOBS STUDY: EVIDENCE AND
EXPLANATIONS 69 (1994). See also STANDING, supra note 31, at 97-101 (identifying, inter
alia, ten "variable labor costs" which are used to provide justification for increased labor
market flexibility); Rittich, supra note 1, at 35-36 (describing labor market flexibility as
the "linchpin" of the World Bank and IMF policy agenda).
75. See Harry Arthurs, Labour Law Beyond the State?, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 15-17
(1996); Marco Biagi, Quality in European Community Industrial Relations, in THE
EVOLVING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE NEW ECONOMY 153, 154-55 (R.
Blanpain ed., 2001); Hugh Collins, The Productive Disintegration of Labour Law, 26
INDUS. L.J. 295, 302-04 (1997); Kerry Rittich, Core Labour Rights and Labour Market
Flexibility: Two Paths Entwined?, in LABOR LAW BEYOND BORDERS: ADR AND THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 157, 162, 175 (Int'l Bureau of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003).
76. STANDING, supra note 31, at 113-14.
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bargaining power between employers and employees so as to
eliminate the substandard working conditions that both undermine
the economic security of citizens and erode the basis of economic
performance as a whole.77 Under flexibility norms, however, labor
market institutions are evaluated not for their capacity to deliver
better terms and conditions of work, but according to their assumed
adverse effects on competition, efficiency, and the rate of economic
growth.78 The result has been downward pressure on labor standards
and reforms that reallocate risks and burdens as between workers and
employers, again, not to the benefit of workers.
Similar objectives are reshaping social policy. Fiscal concerns and
constraints are inducing states to cut back on income transfers and
other forms of social protection and social insurance; think, for
example, of the changes to modern welfare regimes that are designed
to incentivize work by limiting access to public resources, such as the
replacement of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC")7 9  with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
("TANF").80 Whether they emanate from changing demographics
such as falling birth rates that change the ratio of active labor market
participants to dependents; greater capital mobility and regulatory
competition that limit states' capacity to tax;81 the belief that robust
social expenditures are a threat to sound macroeconomic
management;"' or simply greater political or ideological resistance to
77. KARL POLANYI, ORIGINS OF OUR TIME: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 135-36
(1944); Countervailing Power, supra note 61, at 66-69.
78. See STANDING, supra note 31, at 87-88; Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal
Reform, and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 43, 49-50 (2009).
79. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29, repealed by
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (2006)).
80. Temporary Aid to Needy Families ("TANF") is part of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, §§ 101-116. A key
element of TANF is a lifetime limit of five years or sixty months on the amount of time
that a family with an adult can receive federally funded assistance. 42 U.S.C.
§ 608(a)(7)(A) (2006).
81. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of
the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1632-33 (2000); Isabelle Grunberg, Double
Jeopardy: Globalization, Liberalization, and the Fiscal Squeeze, 26 WORLD DEV. 591, 595-
96 (1998).
82. Cutbacks to social expenditures in the name of sound macroeconomic
management are sometimes enforced by the international financial institutions, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, through loan conditionalities. See
Grunberg, supra note 81, at 592, 601.
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taxation;83 concerns about the imbalance between income and
expenditures are placing hard limits on the creative uses of social
policy to reground workers' and households' economic security in the
new economy,84 no matter how much that might be a good idea for
reasons of both efficiency and equity 5 The overarching objective of
social policy now is to "make work pay": to ensure that everyone
possible is induced, cajoled, or coerced into labor market
participation.86
Flexibility policies have intensified the fragmentation of the
standard employment relationship and ensured that much work in the
post-industrial economy is not simply flexible but precarious, that is
poor in terms of economic rewards, working conditions, job or
employment security, and control exercised by workers. The
deliberate displacement of the objectives of worker protection and
countervailing worker power in favor of the promotion of
competitiveness and efficiency through both labor market governance
and social policy mean that workers are increasingly subjected to the
vagaries of product market cycles and other market forces and, as the
financial crisis has disclosed, left with much reduced economic
security in the course of economic downturns.
Two things are worth observing here. First, although often styled
"deregulation," reforms to labor markets are better understood in
legal terms as "reregulation." Flexibility norms typically involve the
simultaneous de-institutionalization (or weakening) of worker rights
and entrenchment (or strengthening) of employer rights and powers.
Job security, for example, may be weakened, or workers' rights to
overtime compensation reduced.87 Second, although redistributive
83. See Lisa Phillips, Tax Law and Social Reproduction: The Gender of Fiscal Policy
in an Age of Privatization, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM 41,41
(Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge eds., 2002).
84. For a fairly comprehensive survey of these constraints, see Grunberg, supra note
81, at 597-99.
85. See generally ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 59 (discussing the relationship
between social protection and labor market integration in postindustrial economies);
ALAIN SUPIOT, BEYOND EMPLOYMENT (2001) (discussing the traditional "Fordist" labor
regime and the current demands for flexibility in employer and employee relationships).
86. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BOOSTING JOBS AND
INCOME: POLICY LESSONS FROM REASSESSING THE OECD JOBS STRATEGY 9-13 (2006);
Kerry Rittich, Social Rights and Social Policy: Transformations on the International
Landscape, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 107, 123
(Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007).
87. See, e.g., Employment Standards Act, R.S.C., ch. 41, § 22 (2000), amended by 2004
R.S.C., ch. 21, § 6 (Can.) (replacing the previous entitlement to overtime pay after forty-
four hours of work per week with an entitlement, subject to the agreement of the
employee, to average overtime payments).
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policies are officially out of fashion, flexibility norms do in fact entail
a significant redistribution of risks and resources in the labor market.
However, in general it is employers and capital holders, rather than
workers and households, who have benefited from this redistribution.
Given their effects on incomes and economic security, it is not
surprising that flexibility norms at work are also generating spillovers
and collateral effects beyond the borders of labor markets which, in
turn, confront and intersect with changes in the household.
B. Fragmentation, Feminization, and Flexibilization at Home
Anyone studying the border between work and family might be
struck by a parallel, related, and equally transformative set of changes
now underway within households: fragmentation, feminization, and
flexibilization are going on there as well.
1. Fragmentation
The nuclear family, with a male breadwinner and an unpaid
female caregiver with only a peripheral if any relation to the
market-the normative basis of everything from the design of labor
and employment law to the delivery of social policy-is now
fragmented and in decline. In its place are myriad diverse families and
households whose form, members, location, and responsibilities are
both recognizable yet profoundly transformed. Contemporary
households, for example, may be organized around same sex as well
as opposite sex couples; they are often blended and multi-
generational as well as nuclear. Indeed, households may be
constituted out of diverse combinations of persons who have
substantial economic and emotional attachments and who assume
reciprocal, ongoing obligations in respect of each other even in the
absence of connections of blood or conjugality. And the demise of the
family wage at work, just described, has dealt a death blow to the
male breadwinner norm at home: now most adults in households
work in the labor market, even where they also work at home. So far,
public policy has been slow to catch up to these changes. In general,
non-standard families and households continue to get less in the way
of income support and tax breaks, and make do on less in the way of
resources as a result.88 For example, single-parent families are much
more likely than others to be poor. 9
88. For a discussion of the way that the Canadian tax code has historically instituted
preferences for married rather than single persons and reflects household norms organized
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2. Feminization
Households and families, as well as labor markets, might also be
thought of as feminized. An increasing number of households have
only a single parent, a trend that seems to be durable, even growing,
rather than temporary or limited in its impact.90 The vast majority of
these single parent households are headed by women.9' Some argue
that the female-led family is now as much the norm as the two-parent
family, and that rather than "deviant," families based on the mother-
child dyad have as much claim to form the basis of family law and
policy as does the nuclear prototype that still prevails in the social
imagination. 92
3. Flexibilization
Families and households are also, in some senses, increasingly
"flexible." While many family bonds are of course enduring, it is also
true that households now form and reform with a speed and degree of
fluidity that would seem breathtaking if measured according to the
norms and benchmarks of only a few years past. Some of this is
attributable to higher rates of separation and divorce, and reflected in
the central questions of family law: What are the financial obligations
of spouses and parents upon marriage breakdown? To what extent
are divorced spouses entitled to support and thereby permitted to
stay out of the market, and when must they make their way back into
it, whatever their roles and obligations when the family was intact?
How should we value the unpaid work of women in the division of
family property? Upon whom should we impose the costs of the care
of children?
Sometimes household fragmentation and reformation are driven
by economic pressures. Families may now split up so that members
can seek, or take, new work, work that in uncertain or poor economic
conditions they may have no option to turn down. Thus, migrant
workers may find themselves sharing more time and living space with
around child-rearing by heterosexual couples and female dependency on male income, see
Phillips, supra note 83, at 46-48.
89. ROSE M. KREIDER & DIANA B. ELLIOTr, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: 2007, at 11-12 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/p20-561.pdf.
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id.
92. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (examining and
criticizing the central role played by the husband and wife dyad in family law and policy).
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virtual strangers, whether those strangers are their employers or other
workers, than they do with their own families. For example, workers
who are driven to urban or suburban centers but are unable to afford
the costs of living in close proximity to where they work may find
themselves living in temporary relations with their co-workers.93 But
households may be voluntarily formed by people who have no blood
or sexual relationship too,94 and economizing may be a powerful
reason for them to do so, especially where incomes are uncertain or
are rising more slowly than household expenditures, as is now the
case.
95
The combined forces of fragmentation, feminization, and
flexibilization at home and at work have not only changed the
structure and operation of households and labor markets, they are
reinforcing each other in ways that intensify the risk and economic
insecurity of workers and family members. The upside of flexible
work for workers is supposed to be rewards commensurate with effort
and economic "value." 96 But flexible labor markets are designed to,
and do in fact, compel workers to become more responsive to market
signals and incentives. 97 They also increase their economic risks. At
the same moment that demands from work disrupt family life,
fragmentation and change in household structure are very likely to
lead to much more income variability and insecurity and, in turn,
enhanced economic pressure as well.
One of the consequences of shifting governance priorities in
labor markets and the sphere of social protection has been the
imposition of greater costs and responsibilities on families and
individual workers. A direct result has been the (re)familialization98
of welfare: the family or household is reemerging an important site of
economic security for large numbers of people. Declining incomes on
the one hand and reduced expenditures on public services and income
transfers on the other are compelling the family to become the
93. See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS 14 (2005).
94. A rising number of people live in non-family households. See KREIDER &
ELLIOTT, supra note 89, at 4.
95. Christian Weller, The Middle Class Falls Back, CHALLENGE, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at
16, 17.
96. STANDING, supra note 31, at 94-96.
97. E.g., id. at 97; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rethinking Labor Law: Employment
Protection for Boundaryless Workers, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW
155, 158-59 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006).
98. ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 59, at 45 ("A familialistic welfare regime is ...
one that assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household.").
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default social support system-the institution that assumes primary
responsibility for its members, even where, as in the case of divorced
spouses, they are no longer officially part of the same family.99
The household has always been an important economic
institution, and it remains a place in which a great deal of care work
and redistribution of resources is expected to, and does in fact,
occur."° Yet the desire to return to a moment in which the family
functioned as the primary source of welfare is, on one level, a fantasy.
There are good reasons to suppose that households and families are
ill-placed to perform the function of welfare-provider of last resort
even if they are so inclined. For example, family members may be far-
flung, including for reasons of economic necessity. Due to the
feminization of the labor force, there may be no one at home in a
position to provide unpaid care. Because for so many workers
incomes have been flat, benefits at work have been cut, and working
for a living has become a much less reliable source of security than it
used to be,10 ! covering even basic household expenses is a strain; in
these circumstances, supporting others on top of immediate
household members is likely to be difficult if not out of the question.
In short, because of a range of economic and labor market changes
that have already been underway for at least the last three decades,
assuming greater economic responsibility for family members is
simply now more difficult to do.
In addition, it is not difficult to observe how privatized or
familialized social security schemes place some groups at a sharp
disadvantage. Women are typically expected to, and often do,
perform more unpaid caregiving and domestic labor for others when
publicly provided health and social services are cut back."° In some
societies, norms and practices around the gender division of unpaid
work are starting to shift.103 However, it is important to understand
99. See generally Brenda Cossman, Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative
Visions of the Reprivatization Project, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE TO
FEMINISM, supra note 83, at 169 (describing changes in family and social welfare law in
Canada in the areas of spousal definition, spousal and child support, and social welfare for
single mothers, all of which impose more of the costs of social reproduction on families).
100. See MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED 25-27 (1988); Benerfa, supra note
31, at 1506; Diane Elson, Labor Markets as Gendered Institutions: Equality, Efficiency and
Empowerment Issues, 27 WORLD DEv. 611, 612 (1999).
101. See, e.g., Green & Shierholz, supra note 32.
102. See Joan M. Gilmour, Creeping Privatization in Health Care: Implications for
Women as the State Withdraws Its Role, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE TO
FEMINISM, supra note 83, at 267, 270-71.
103. See, e.g., Beneria, supra note 31, at 1503-05 (reporting that gender norms around
unpaid labor are beginning to shift in Spain).
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the countervailing forces that might work against the assumption of
greater unpaid work obligations by household members, whether
male or female. Flexibility norms privilege the unencumbered worker
who is both prepared and able to subordinate family obligations to
the demands of the market. Market work organized to compel
workers to respond primarily to economic signals is likely to be a
disincentive to, or simply a hard constraint on, the performance of
unpaid work, no matter how valuable or necessary, like child or elder
care, such work might be. Whatever their advantages according to
standard economic assumptions, regulatory regimes that are
organized to promote the performance of ever more market work
often make it more difficult to respond to family demands. Moreover,
single parent families in particular are typically in no position to
conform to limitless demands at work. Here, flexible work might
seem like the magic bullet; rather than the problem, it seems to
promise a solution to the conflict between work and family. But
flexibility typically comes at a cost for women in the form of lower
incomes and foregone opportunities for advancement at work."° And
the flexible labor markets of the United States are associated with
high rates of poverty, especially for single parent households. °5
These tensions and countervailing trends are provoking crises at
home and work. While people are, as they must, trying to cope as best
they can, typically by just working more at home and in the market,
we have not begun to come to grips with the profound intensification
in workload and responsibilities that fragmentation, feminization, and
flexibilization both at home and work entail and provoke.
Whether, and in what ways, these developments are ultimately
sustainable is unclear, but what is certain is that we do not know, and
have not even begun to even assess, the full range of costs that these
processes entail. The costs of simultaneously flexibilizing labor
markets and mobilizing women for market work include: the
fragmentation of families; the loss or reduction of nonmarket
production and services; and an increase in total work burden,
especially for women who continue to perform the majority of unpaid
work as well. But these costs also extend to changes in quality and
extent of care to family members as women rotate into poorly
remunerated work, and other women, often equally poorly paid, take
their place as caregivers. This, in turn, introduces cleavages among
104. See Elson, supra note 100, at 612-13.
105. See KREIDER & ELLIOTr, supra note 89, at 11 (reporting that a quarter of
mother-only households have incomes below $15,000).
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women in the labor market: splits or shifts in the position of better
and worse off women, those who are paid well and can purchase child
care services on the market and those who are not and must rely on
informal arrangements or family networks for care.
CONCLUSION: BACK TO THE CRISIS
The financial crisis, and the jobs and housing crises to which it is
linked, is not only revealing the effects of labor and other types of
market flexibility norms on social welfare. The crisis is also
demonstrating something that feminist economists and sociologists
have long argued, which is that there are continuous flows of
resources, risk, power, and labor across households and markets;106
only a preexisting commitment to the idea that they are distinct
spheres prevents us from observing the ways in which home and
market are deeply intertwined and interconnected. Many of the
apparent "efficiencies" obtained by changing legal norms, including
those designed to make labor markets more flexible, are obtained by
imposing greater costs on households and individuals, and often
women in particular, costs that do not show up in standard measures
of economic growth.0 7 There have long been arguments that this state
of affairs should be reversed: for example, that subsidies and
contributions from home-based production should be priced-in rather
than discounted or externalized from the calculus when we judge the
state of the economy,0 8 and that the costs or "tax"-whether in terms
of foregone wages or market opportunities-for those who now
perform nonmarket work should be compensated rather than
ignored.10 9 The current emphasis on flexible labor markets and
106. See generally Diane Elson, Micro, Meso, Macro: Gender and Economic Analysis in
the Context of Policy Reform, in THE STRATEGIC SILENCE: GENDER AND ECONOMIC
POLICY 33 (Isabella Bakker ed., 1994) (explaining the interconnections between the
monetized and non-monetized economy); Bina Agarwal, "Bargaining" and Gender
Relations: Within and Beyond the Household, FEMINIST ECON., Mar. 1997, at 1 (describing
how market opportunities for women affect gender relations within the household).
107. Diane Elson, From Survival Strategies to Transformation Strategies: Women's
Needs and Structural Adjustment, in UNEQUAL BURDEN: ECONOMIC CRISIS, PERSISTENT
POVERTY, AND WOMEN'S WORK 26, 31-36 (Lourdes Beneria & Shelley Feldman eds.,
1992) (explaining that macroeconomists may ignore any increased costs imposed on
households because of the view that they have no repercussions for the monetized
economy).
108. See generally WARING, supra note 100 (discussing various studies and the methods
used to calculate the value of women's unpaid work in the home). For a contemporary
analysis, see STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 21, at 21-23.
109. Ingrid Palmer, Public Finance from a Gender Perspective, 23 WORLD DEV. 1981,
1985 (1995).
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market valuation of labor only strengthens these arguments because
it intensifies the market penalties for those who do unpaid work.
But there is another reason that these arguments should now be
regarded as more persuasive. The crisis is revealing how misguided it
is to conflate maximum flexibility for employers and maximum
disposability of workers with anything like the "general good." And
we are starting to gain an appreciation of how distorted the valuation
of economic activity-and how unreliable the connection between
economic growth and welfare gains-might be when the gains to
firms, employers, and shareholders are counted on the positive side of
the ledger without subtracting the losses and risks to workers,
households, communities, and the population at large.11°
We might look at the issues connecting home and market as
discrete and important problems, deserving of solutions in their own
right because they are important to values such as social justice or
gender equality."' But we might also understand home and work as
interconnected sites of a more general struggle over the nature and
character of global governance. For it turns out that what connects
families and markets-for example, the terms of women's labor
market participation, the availability of child care, even the presence
or absence of health care-also affects "hard" economic issues such
as human capital creation, global competitiveness, and long-term
fiscal sustainability. 1 2
Here, it is helpful to know that the laws and policies that make
for competitive and efficient markets, labor markets in particular, are
anything but straightforward, prevailing economic and regulatory
theories that suggest otherwise notwithstanding."3 The reported
tradeoffs between equity and efficiency, for instance, may be more
theoretical than real; job security may not, in fact, always come at the
cost of higher unemployment; and labor market flexibility does not,
on its own, necessarily produce either more jobs or greater economic
growth.1 4 But even if flexibility does seem like both an attractive and
an inevitable feature of the new economy, flexibility at work has
many different forms and faces-it might be functional or
110. See STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 21, at 29-30.
111. See Benerfa, supra note 31, at 1520 (discussing feminist versus functionalist
motivations for reconciling work and family).
112. ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 2, at 130.
113. Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Labour Law and Economic Theory: A
Reappraisal, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION, supra note 61, at
29, 31-33.
114. See Rittich, supra note 31, at 270-74.
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numerical, 5 or temporal and geographic, for example. Which forms
are desirable, and when, are questions that do not admit of any single
answer; instead, they look different depending on the value, metric,
or standpoint by which they are assessed. Because flexibility is
ultimately about who possesses control, 16 workers may differ on the
question from employers, and workers with obligations to family
members may hold different views from those without them.
Moreover, what looks optimal from the standpoint of the private
sector may look undesirable, or even perverse, when assessed
according to the economy or polity as a whole. In short, there is no
single story to be told about what flexibility at work even is, let alone
whether it is desirable.
As the current crisis is disclosing, the gains from flexible labor
markets may be illusory, especially to the extent that they merely
transfer costs and risks to workers or the community at large.
Whatever their benefits in boom times, and it is apparent that they
are less than even their champions supposed, economies organized
around infinitely disposable workers may set in motion events whose
negative effects are difficult to control and whose ultimate
consequence is to depress the economy as a whole. 7 Large
populations of working poor are a tragedy, and a condemnation, in
their own right." 8  Unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment, is likely to impoverish children and generate serious
social, economic, and even political problems down the road.
Moreover, the full brunt of the costs of poverty and unemployment
do not just fall on those most directly affected. Low incomes
inevitably contribute to falling demand and depressed economic
conditions. Unemployment erodes tax bases, inducing states and
municipalities to lay off public sector workers, creating still more
unemployment and yet lower demand." 9 In short, the cycle continues
and the consequences widen.
115. STANDING, supra note 31, at 101-02, 114-17; Sandra Fredman, Precarious Norms
for Precarious Workers, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN AND THE NEW ECONOMY: THE
CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS, supra note 1, at 166, 177.
116. STANDING, supra note 31, at 81.
117. See generally LOUIS UCIHITELLE, THE DISPOSABLE AMERICAN: LAYOFFS AND
THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2006) (documenting the rise and fall of job security in America
and the social and economic effects of increasing layoffs).
118. See generally DAVID SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR (2004) (exploring the causes
and effects of being a member of America's "working poor").
119. Lucy Dadaan & Donald J. Boyd, Rockefeller Inst., State Tax Revenues Show
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Even skeptics are now getting an object lesson in how tightly
connected families and households are to the market in a globalized
world and how difficult, if not impossible, it is to imagine
(re)stabilizing economic relations while holding the family in
abeyance. Whether, and how, we use the insights the crisis has
generated to examine the connections between them and rethink our
strategies and priorities is now the question.
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